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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintifiTPetitioner,
Case No. 20040566-SC

vs.
HEATHER JO RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant/Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
* * *

Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State submits this brief
in reply to the new matters raised in respondent's brief.
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S SUBPOINT A
WHERE PRACTICABLE, A BRIGHT-LINE RULE IS PREFERABLE
TO CASES-BY-CASE ANALYSIS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
ISSUES
Defendant urges this Court to reject a bright-line rule regarding warrantless blood
draws because "this Court and the Supreme Court have already spoken strongly against per
se rules of exigency." See Br. Resp't at 24. She argues that "the Supreme Court has
repeatedly refused to allow per se rules to replace the totality of the circumstances test," and
cites to United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003); Payton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573
(1980); and Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). See Br. Resp't at 15-16.
The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is replete with examples of
the Court adopting a bright-line rule over case-by-case, totality of the circumstances analysis.
In fact, the Supreme Court has stated a preference, where practicable, for clear rules in

Fourth Amendment cases. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458-59 (1981). The
"protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 'can only be realized if the police are
acting under a set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct
determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of
law enforcement.'" Id. at 458 (quoting LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" versus
"Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S.Ct.Rev. 127, 142). "When a
person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation,
that person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know
the scope of his authority." Id. at 459-60. For that reason, the Fourth Amendment favors,
where practicable, '"[a] single, familiar standard."' Id. at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)).
Accordingly, the Court has adopted bright-line rules for a variety of circumstances.
For example, a police officer may always search a person incident to a lawful arrest with or
without individualized suspicion that the arrestee is carrying contraband or weapons. See
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,235 (1973). An officer may also always search the
area within the arrestee's immediate control or the passenger compartment of his car. See
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-61; Chimelv. California, 395 U.S. 752,763 (1969). An officer may
also always order a person out of a lawfully stopped vehicle, see Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106,110-11 (1977). Further, he may always search a readily mobile car without a
warrant, including the trunk and containers, if he has probable cause to believe the car
contains contraband or evidence of a crime. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302
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\ .ood^iicam. As the amici pointed

out, estimating the amount of time it will take for alcohol in a suspect's blood to dissipate to
below the level of legal intoxication requires officers to know the suspect's current bloodalcohol level and his or her alcohol elimination rate—information that can only be known by
"chemical tests administered over a period of time after drinking ceases and the alcohol is
fully absorbed."

See Br. Amici at 6-8.

In other words, in every impaired driving

investigation, officers know the evidence is dissipating, but they don't know how much
evidence there is or how fast it is dissipating. Thus, any delay to seek a warrant risks loss of
the evidence and guarantees alteration of the evidence.
Even the court of appeals recognized that the U.S. Supreme Court cases following
Schmerber support the reasonableness of a bright-line rule. It noted that "later statements by
the United States Supreme Court concerning Schmerber v. California . . . suggest that the
evanescent nature of blood-alcohol may be sufficient, in and of itself, to justify a warrantless
blood draw." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, f 13 n.2 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 206, 623 (1989) and South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553
(1983)).
The other factors relied on by the court of appeals, such as the availability of a
magistrate and the length of time it will take to get a warrant, do not help resolve the
question of exigency. See State v. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, f 17, 93 P.3d 854. An
officer may guess at how long it would take to obtain a warrant, but the guess is useless
without an estimate of how long the evidence of legal impairment will remain in the
suspect's bloodstream. Equally unworkable is defendant's suggestion that officers seek a
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with a recurring exigency, and because both invasions involved the highly protected interior
of the home, the bright-line rules the government sought were unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
In the instant case, a bright-line rule permitting warrantless blood draws is justified by
a recurring exigency and constitutes a minimal intrusion on a person's privacy and bodily
integrity. In every alcohol-related driving investigation, the inevitable dissipation of alcohol
from the blood creates the risk that evidence of the suspect's legal impairment will disappear
before police can obtain a warrant. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that "the intrusion occasioned by a blood test is not significant." Skinner v. Railway
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989); see also Br. Pet. at 19-20 (citing cases in
which Supreme Court has noted that intrusion of blood draw on Fourth Amendment rights is
minimal).
In Banks, the exigency in question did not lend itself to a general rule because the
variety of circumstances to which the rule would have to apply were too numerous. Banks
concerned how long officers serving a search warrant on a home must wait before forcing
entry. Banks, 540 U.S. at 33. The Court refused to adopt a bright-line rule about the length
of time police must wait after announcing their presence. Banks, 540 U.S. at 41. It noted
that the exigency justifying a forcible entry arises from the threat of destruction of evidence
when police announce their presence. Id. at 36-37. What constituted a reasonable period of
time to wait before forcing entry thus turned on the nature of the evidence sought and the
ability of the suspect to dispose of the evidence before police could enter the home—a highly
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fact sensitive determination. Id. at 39-41. The court explained, "Police seeking a stolen
piano may be able to spend more time to make sure they really need the battering ram." Id.
at41.
In contrast to Banks, the dispositive facts that create the exigency in the instant case
are the same in every alcohol-related traffic investigation. Police always know the evidence
is disappearing, but they never know how much evidence there is or how fast it is
disappearing. Thus, unlike the officers serving a warrant in Banks, police seeking a blood
draw from an intoxicated suspect cannot guess at the amount of time they may wait before
the evidence is lost.
THE STATE AND FEDERAL CASES CITED BY THE STATE
SUPPORT A BRIGHT-LINE RULE THAT THE DISSIPATION OF
ALCOHOL IS AN EXIGENCY THAT JUSTIFIES A WARRANTLESS
BLOOD DRAW
Defendant claims that "the cases cited by the State [in its brief of petitioner] do not
adopt a per se rule of exigency in DUI cases." Br. Resp't at 24. She argues that in most of
the cases "the defendants did not challenge exigency and the ongoing and continuous nature
of the investigations combined with the evanescence of the evidence sought made exigency
obvious." Br. Resp't at 24-25.
The State disagrees with defendant's characterizations of the cases. A couple of
examples will demonstrate. Defendant claims that the court in State v. Cocio "had no
opportunity to analyze exigency in DUI cases" because "the investigation was continuous
and the defendant did not argue the officers had time to obtain a warrant." Br. Resp't at 26.
Cocio was involved in a collision that killed the passenger of the other car. State v. Cocio,
1

709 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Ariz. 1985). Police suspected Cocio was intoxicated and obtained
without a warrant a sample of Cocio's blood from the hospital staff. Id. at 1344.
Cocio argued before the Arizona Supreme Court that "the warrantless taking of a
blood sample when he was not under arrest violated the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution." Id. In rejecting Cocio's claim, the court first held that a valid arrest
was not a justification or prerequisite for a warrantless blood draw. Id. at 1344-45. The
Cocio court then considered exigent circumstances as a justification for the warrantless blood
draw. Id. at 1345. It noted that in Cupp v. Murphy, All U.S. 291 (1973), the U.S. Supreme
Court approved the warrantless scraping of a suspect's fingernails prior to his formal arrest
because of the "limited intrusion" and "the ready destructibility of the evidence." Id. The
Cocio court then held that under Schmerber and Cupp exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless blood draw because the "imminent destruction of the evidence is likely and the
intrusion is minimal." Id. at 1345. It stated, "The highly evanescent nature of alcohol in
[Cocio]'s blood stream guaranteed that the alcohol would dissipate over a relatively short
period of time." Id. (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770). The court further noted that "the
exigent circumstances in this case are even more compelling than Cupp since alcohol in a
suspect's blood is certain to disappear while the physical evidence on defendant in Cupp was
only very likely to disappear while a search warrant was obtained." Id.
Defendant also claims that exigency was not an issue in State v. Bohling, 494 N.W.2d
399 (Wis.), cert, denied, 540 U.S. 836 (1993). See Br. Resp't at 26. The first sentence in the
Bohling opinion states, "The issue in this case is whether the fact that the percentage of
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alcohol in a person's blood stream rapidly diminishes after drinking stops alone constitutes a
sufficient exigency under the Fourth Amendment... to justify a warrantless blood draw . . .
." Bohling, 494 N.W.2d at 399-400. The court held that it did. Id. at 406.
The Bohling court also adopted a bright-line rule permitting warrantless blood draws
in impaired driving cases. It stated in its opinion, "A logical analysis of the Schmerber
decision indicates that the exigency of the situation presented was caused solely by the fact
that the amount of alcohol in a person's blood stream diminishes over time." Bohling, 494
N.W.2dat402.
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S SUBPOINT C
THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE AMICI DO NOT EXPAND THE
SCOPE OF THE ISSUE ON REVIEW
Defendant asserts that "this Court should disregard the amicus brief because it
enlarges the issue on certiorari review." Br. Resp't at 36. She asserts that the factors that
affect alcohol dissipation rates are "not an issue on certiorari review." Br. Resp't at 36-37.
Rule 49, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, states that this Court will review under a
writ of certiorari "the questions set forth in the petition [for a writ of certiorari] or fairly
included therein." Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). The question this Court set for review in the
instant case is "[w]hether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without more, created an
exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from
respondent." Order of the Supreme Court, Case No. 20040566-SC, dated October 18,2004.
The purpose of the amici's brief is to provide the court with the underlying scientific
data that demonstrates why the dissipation of alcohol is, without more, a sufficient exigency
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to justify a warrantless blood draw.

The factors affecting alcohol dissipation rates

demonstrate that the loss or alteration of blood-alcohol evidence is both inevitable and
impossible to predict without chemical analysis. Thus, "the delay necessary to obtain a
warrant, under the circumstances, threaten[s] the destruction of evidence." Schmerber, 684
U.S. at 770 (quotations and citations omitted).
THE SCIENTIFIC ARTICLES CITED BY DEFENDANT SUPPORT
THE PROPOSITION THAT ALCOHOL DISSIPATION IS
CONTINUOUS AND VARIABLE AND THUS AN EXIGENCY
Defendant asserts that the scientific articles proffered by the amici "are contradicted
by other scientific articles not presented by amici." Br. Resp't at 39. Defendant then cites
several scientific articles with parenthetical explanations that the articles contradict some
conclusions in the amici's articles. See Br. Resp't at 39-40. In fact, defendant's articles
support the amici's proposition that alcohol dissipation is continuous and variable and thus
an exigency.
The amici conclude that alcohol elimination rates are affected by a variety of factors
including "the drinker's gender and age, the drinker's overall health, the type of beverage
consumed, . . . the circumstances under which the drinks are consumed," the presence of
food in the drinker's stomach, and whether the drinker is an alcoholic or casual drinker. See
Br. Amici at 5-6. The articles cited by defendant support this conclusion. See Dominick A.
Labianca, Uncertainty in the Results of Breath Alcohol Analyses, 76 J. Chemical Educ. 508,
508-09 (1999) (criticizing methods of Alan W. Jones and Lars Andersson, cited in
Addendum G of amici's brief, and suggesting that other research indicates that variance in
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absorption and elimination rates is much greater than estimated by Jones and Andersson);
A.W. Jones & A. Neri, Evaluation of Blood-Ethanol Profiles After Consumption of Alcohol
Together With a Large Meal 24 Canadian Soc'y Forensic Sci. J. 165, 167-70 (Sept. 1991)
(noting that "[t]he absorption, distribution and elimination of ethanol depend on a multitude
of genetic and environmental factors" and finding that test subjects exhibited large variance
in time to reach peak blood alcohol levels); Charles L. Winek & Kathy L. Murphy, The Rate
and Kinetic Order of Ethanol Elimination, 25 Forensic Sci. Int'l 159, 159-66 (July 1984)
(concluding that alcohol is eliminated at a constant rate but that a "variance in ethanol
elimination rates exists among individuals.").
The amici also explain how, absent a blood test, it is nearly impossible for police to
determine a person's blood-alcohol level and elimination rate with any degree of accuracy.
Br. Amici at 6-7. Defendant cites three articles with parenthetical explanations suggesting
that retrograde extrapolation of a suspect's blood alcohol level is possible. Br. Resp't at 40.
These articles demonstrate, however, that retrograde extrapolation is an unworkable solution
to the exigency police face because extrapolation requires knowledge of the suspect's
drinking patterns.

See A.R. Stowell & L.I. Stowell, Estimation of Blood Alcohol

Concentrations after Social Drinking, 43 J. Forensic Sci. 14,14-21 (Jan. 1998) (explaining
that retrograde extrapolation is only accurate where it is known that suspect is in
postabsorptive state between the accident and the time of blood sampling); U.S. Dept. of
Transporation, Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Computing a BAC Estimate (Oct.
1994), available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/ people/injury/bacreport.html (explaining how
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to estimate blood-alcohol level from known drinking pattern). As explained by the amici, an
officer "will rarely have accurate information regarding the suspect's drinking history, actual
amount of alcohol consumed, [and] when it was consumed." Br. Amici at 7. Suspects are
often the only source of this information, and they have little incentive to waive their Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and provide the officer with their drinking
history.
Defendant cited one article in which the authors explained how to estimate a subject's
blood-alcohol level when the subject's recent drinking pattern is unknown

See M.

Montgomery & M. Reasor, Retrograde Extrapolation of Blood Alcohol Data: An Applied
Approach, 36 J. Toxicology & Envtl. Health 281 281-92 (1992). The result was reached
only by assuming a blood sample taken after the accident was available to use in the
calculation. Id. at 289. The blood-alcohol estimate was between .03 and .13 grams per
deciliter.1 Id. at 290. Such a range is useless in determining how long police may wait
before the evidence is lost. Moreover, the requirement that a blood sample be taken in order
to have a starting point from which to calculate backwards moots the question of exigency.
In short, the articles cited by defendant support the proposition that the dissipation of
alcohol is always an exigency. They demonstrate that estimating how long it will take for
alcohol to dissipate from a person's blood stream is next to impossible without an accurate

1

The statutory impairment level is .08 grams per deciliter. See Utah Code Ann. §416-44(2)(a)(i) (West 2004).
12

picture of the suspect's drinking pattern and a chemical test. Police will therefore risk losing
the evidence of the suspect's legal impairment if they delay to seek a warrant.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the opening brief, the State respectfully
requests the Court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and to remand the case for
further proceedings.2
Respectfully submitted this I{

day of August 2005.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEYGENERAL

MATTHEW D. BATES
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Petitioner

Because the court of appeals did not decide the issue of probable cause, see
Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, \ 9, this Court should remand defendant's case for the court
of appeals to decide that question. See State v. Maguire, 957 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1998)
(reversing court of appeals and remanding for determination of issue raised by respondent in
court of appeals but not addressed by that court).
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day of August 2005,1 served four copies of the

foregoing Reply Brief of Petitioner upon the defendant/respondent, Heather Jo Rodriguez,
and two copies of the brief on the amici, by causing them to be delivered by hand to their
counsel of record as follows:
Lori J.Seppi
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Janice L. Frost
Attorney for Amici
220 East Morris Ave., 2nd Floor
South Salt Lake, Utah 84115
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